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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the role of ideology in Soviet economic
reform programs. Three major economic initiatives in which worker cooperatives were
designed to play a leading role in transforming the Soviet economy will be examined for
similarities and differences: the New Economic Policy (NEP), the collectivization
campaign, and the perestroika project.
To establish a common frame of reference for comparison of the three economic
programs, the thesis will begin with a survey of literature on the uses of ideology by
Communist regimes. The writings of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin on cooperatives will
also be studied to develop further the conceptual framework for analysis.
After this background information has been provided, the actual cooperative
strategies of Nikolai Bukharin during the NEP, Josef Stalin during the collectivization
drive, and Mikhail Gorbachev during the perestroika program will be investigated. The
motivations of each leader for introducing co-operative reform and the ways in which each
one used ideology to introduce and implement his policy will be distinguished.
Analysis of the three programs will yield insights into the process and aims of
Soviet reform. First, Soviet leaders do often turn to Marxism-Leninism for guidance when
devising strategies for economic renewal. Second, ideology is also used by Soviet leaders
to justify economic policies to Party members and to encourage popular support for and
participation in reform campaigns. Finally, it is evident that only the programs of Bukharin
and Gorbachev represent sincere attempts to execute the will of Marx and Lenin concerning
the promotion of voluntary cooperatives and market socialism.

The Role of Ideology in Soviet Economic Reform:
A Comparison of the NEP, the Collectivization Campaign,
and the Perestroika Program

INTRODUCTION

Since Vladimir Ilyich Lenin led the Bolshevik Party to power in 1917, Western
analysts have pondered what considerations guide Soviet leaders in the making of policy.
Throughout much of the post-war era, many of these analysts had concurred that
Marxism-Leninism was the single most important factor in Soviet policy-making.1 In the
eyes of these kremlinologists, Soviet leaders from Lenin onward had attempted to build a
Communist society by following an ideological blueprint which had changed very little
since 1917.
However, according to many of these same Soviet observers, Mikhail Gorbachev
has largely discarded ideology as a policy-making consideration, and, in fact, has
abandoned Marxism-Leninism.2 Primarily, they cite Gorbachev’s extensive efforts to
institutionalize market mechanisms and democratic forces as proof that he has tacitly
renounced the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. These analysts further assert
that Gorbachev will either transform the CPSU into a weakened Western European-style
socialist party, or will be toppled by more conservative forces within the Party.3 A closer
look at the nature of ideology and the Soviet experience, however, yields markedly
different conclusions from those reached by the Western scholars discussed above. Such a
thorough examination of the historical development of Marxism-Leninism in the USSR
reveals that Soviet leaders have not been averse to adapting ideology to changing material
circumstances, especially during reform campaigns designed to promote economic
liberalization and political decentralization. Further, this sort of critique suggests that a
strong case can be made for the argument that Josef Stalin perverted many of the Marxist
2
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ideals and programs espoused by the original Bolsheviks, including Lenin. Also, this type
of analysis indicates that Gorbachev sought to revitalize the CPSU and the USSR by re
introducing Lenin’s later writings on Soviet socialism and by devising strategies for
contemporary socialist development which were predicated on the theories and
recommendations for Soviet growth conceived by the first Soviet leader.
In this essay, such an examination of the evolution of Soviet ideology will be
undertaken. While it would be extremely interesting to analyze how various Soviet leaders
have interpreted Marxism- Leninism and applied their theoretical understanding to the
gamut of activities that the CPSU attempts to control, it is simply not practical to do so in a
thesis of this sort. Instead, the focus of this study will be restricted to the investigation of
the ideological justifications for policies concerning cooperative enterprises given by Soviet
leaders during three different economic campaigns: the New Economic Policy (NEP), the
collectivization drive, and the perestroika program.
However, in order to familiarize the reader with concepts essential to understanding
Soviet ideology, it will be necessary to provide a broad overview of Marxist-Leninist
ideology in chapter one. Next, in chapter two, Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP) will
be thoroughly analyzed from an ideological standpoint. Then, Stalin’s forced
collectivization program will be examined in terms of its fidelity to Marxist-Leninist ideals
and its long-term effect on the Soviet economy in chapter three. Finally, in chapter four,
Gorbachev’s attempts, prior to the Twenty-Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU), to reinvigorate Soviet cooperatives through an ideological campaign
will be studied.
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CHAPTER I
AN OVERVIEW OF IDEOLOGY

Definition and Functions of Ideology
Before examining what role Marxism-Leninism plays in Soviet society, it is
necessary to define ideology in general terms. In Politics in the Communist World, Leslie
Holmes, provides such a definition. According to Holmes, any ideology has the following
three characteristics. First, ideology is a set of largely unverifiable beliefs. Second, it
performs socially necessary functions for the group promoting it. Finally, the group
advocating the particular ideology must be organizing, or have organized, itself.1
After offering this definition, Holmes identifies seven functions which ideology
serves in Communist societies: legitimation, motivation, justification, activation,
communication, socialization, and limitation.2 One of the most important of these functions
to ruling Communist parties is certainly legitimation, because in the absence of genuine
multi-party elections, these governments have to rely on Marxism-Leninism as the political
rationale for their rule. Concerning the policy-making process, ideology is both a source
of inspiration for Communist leaders and a means of justifying their decisions. Further,
these leaders seek to energize, or activate, the masses to carry out particular policies
through the use of ideology.3
Communist authorities also utilize Marxism-Leninism to build long-term societal
commitment to socialist ideals, a process which Western political scientists refer to as
“socialization.” Consequently, Marxist-Leninist phraseology becomes essential in the
communication between the people, concerning their needs and frustrations, and the
5
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Communist government, regarding its expectations and capabilities. Finally, the
Communist parties’ attempts to inculcate proletarian values into their people combined with
the gradual development of a common socialist language results in the creation of selfimposed limits on what actions can be considered compatible with Marxism-Leninism.4
The Enduring Components of Marxism-Leninism
Having defined and identified the functions of ideology in Communist societies in
general, it is now possible to examine the essence of Marxism-Leninism in Soviet society
in particular. Because Marxism-Leninism has been interpreted in widely different ways by
both Western scholars and Soviet leaders, it is necessary to identify the base upon which
all, or at least most, of these divergent interpretations have been predicated. This can best
be accomplished by looking separately at the contributions made by Marx and Lenin which
have gone virtually unchallenged since the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917.
Marx provided Lenin and the original Bolsheviks with a scientific method for
studying societal development, a thorough critique of the existing capitalist order, and a
general strategy for socialist revolution. According to Marx, societies were universally
subject to his theory of historical materialism, which asserted that a given society’s stage of
historical development was determined by the relationship between the means of production
and the relations of production. (In Marxist terminology, the means of production is
equivalent to the technology and labor power necessary to make goods, while the relations
of production refers to the relationship between the owners of the means of production and
the common workers, who actually produce the goods.) Further, Marx posited that a given
society’s progression along his self-defined ladder of historical development occurred only
when the means of production evolved at a greater rate than the relations of production,
which resulted in the revolutionary overthrow of one class by another.5
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Marx devoted much of his life to analyzing the capitalist phase of development,
which the US and most of Western Europe were undergoing in the mid-1800s. He
concluded that the preoccupation with profit accumulation displayed by the bourgeoisie, the
owners of the means of production, combined with the ever-increasing exploitation of the
proletariat inevitably would lead to socialist revolution. The proletariat would triumph
ultimately, and then would form a collective dictatorship, socialize the means of
production, and abolish class distinctions. Eventually, this dictatorship would wither
away, and man would live harmoniously with one another, guided by the dictate, “From
each according to his ability to each according to his need.”6
One of Marx’s conceptions concerning the socialization of the means of production
which deserves special attention because of the focus of this paper is that of cooperative
ownership. Defining cooperation as “the form of labor of many persons, methodically
working together and alongside one another in the same production process or in related
production processes,” Marx expressed great optimism in the socialist potential of
cooperatives.7 He first spoke of the benefits of cooperatives in two essays that he wrote in
collaboration with Ernest Jones, a British socialist and journalist in 1851.
In their essays, Marx and Jones posited that cooperatives provided their members
with a more equitable distribution of assets than did capitalist firms. However, the two
authors also asserted that cooperatives were not as socially useful as they could be because
they competed with, and absorbed, other co-operatives, and because capitalist institutions
conspired to create many obstacles for the cooperatives such as steep taxation, restrictive
land transfer laws, and high-cost export procedures. Therefore, Marx and Jones
concluded that cooperation needed to be expanded on a nationwide scale and that political
power had to be seized by the proletariat before a socialist society could be constructed.8
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Marx elaborated on this conception in several other works and speeches, with his
most impassioned defense of cooperation being delivered in his “Inaugural Address of the
Working Men’s International Association.” In this speech, Marx said:
%

The value of these great social experiments (cooperatives) cannot be
overrated. By deed, instead of by argument, they have shown that
production on a large scale, and in accord with the behests of modern
science, may be carried on without the existence of a class of masters
employing a class of hands.. .To save the industrious masses,
cooperative labor ought to be developed to national dimensions, and,
consequently, to be fostered by national means.9
From this quote, it is again apparent that Marx believed that cooperative enterprises
should play a crucial role in the development of socialist societies. Marx also urged that
cooperatives be given a central role in the creation of socialist society in some of his later
works. In “Critique of the Gotha Program,” Marx asserted that a socialist society should
be a “cooperative society based on the common ownership of the means of production.”10
In Capital, he re-iterated this thought when he stated that the means of production should be
“in the hands of associated producers (i.e., cooperatives).”11 Finally, in a letter to Vera
Zasulich, a Russian populist, Marx wrote that because peasant cooperatives existed on a
nation-wide scale in Russia, it was possible for these cooperatives to “develop directly into
an element of socialist production” if they could “gradually shake off (their)
primitive quailities. Friedrich Engels, the co-founder of scientific socialism, further
elaborated on the development of co-operatives in several of his works. In The Origin o f
the Family, Private Property, and the State, Engels wrote that socialist society would
“recognize production on the basis of a free and equal association of producers.”13 Engels
provided another important clarification of Marxist thought concerning the voluntary nature
of cooperatives in “The Peasant Question in France and Germany.” In this article,
Engels stated:
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When we are in possession of state power, we shall not even think of
expropriating the small peasants.. .Our task relative to the small peasants
consists, in the first place, in effecting a transition of his private
enterprise and private possession into cooperating ones, not forcibly but
by dint of example and the proffer of social assistance for this purpose.14
This quote reflects both the importance which Marx and Engels felt that the encouragement
and formation of cooperatives in the early days of a socialist government should be given,
and their belief that this goal should not be accomplished through coercion.
Accepting the validity of Marx’s theory of historical materialism, critique of
capitalism, and prophesy of socialist revolution, Lenin sought to “update” Marxism to
reflect changes in material circumstances which had occurred since Marx’s death in 1883.
Specifically, Lenin developed two theories to explain why socialist revolution had not yet
manifested itself and to propose what new economic conditions and revolutionary strategies
were necessary for a socialist seizure of power. It is worthwhile to study briefly these
theories on imperialism and a Communist vanguard since they were critical to Lenin’s
ideological justification of the establishment of socialism in Russia and to the claims of
subsequent Communist leaders about the ideological legitimacy of creating socialism in
nations which, like czarist Russia, had not experienced advanced capitalism.
Lenin provided his explanation for why Marx’s prediction of socialist revolution
had yet to be fulfilled in Imperialism, The Highest Stage o f Capitalism. In this book, Lenin
argued that large industrial-financial monopolies in the most developed countries had been
able to postpone socialist overthrow in their native lands by modestly improving the
proletariat’s standard of living and by bribing labor leaders not to organize large,
coordinated strikes. According to Lenin, the monopolies obtained the funds necessary to
pursue this two-pronged strategy from profits they derived from large-scale exporting
activities to less developed countries.15
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However, Lenin asserted that this type of capital export actually contained the seeds for
socialist revolution. He theorized that armed conflict between the most advanced capitalist
countries would inevitably arise because of the insatiable desire of their national
monopolies for new markets in which to invest their capital and the finite number of
exploitable territories. Lenin further prophesied that these warring imperialists would cause
many other nations to become involved in their hostilities.16 In Lenin’s view, it was
during such a time of worldwide crisis that the chances were best for a socialist revolution
to be executed successfully in a country which had just entered the capitalist epoch.17
Specifically, Lenin figured that the strains of an international war would exacerbate
the suffering of the masses of a newly created capitalist state to the point where they would
protest in large numbers. According to Lenin’s revolutionary plan, it would then be the
responsibility of a well-organized Communist Party to form an alliance of the different
protesting groups, which would consist primarily of the proletariat and the peasantry.
Lenin predicted that this coalition would seize power from the bourgeoisie government
whose attention and resources had been largely expended on the war. Finally, Lenin
posited that once this overthrow had been achieved, the Communist vanguard would begin
to build socialism within the country.18
To Lenin, the development of a national network of cooperatives was an essential
element of this building process. Following the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917, Lenin
immediately expressed his belief in the socialist potential for cooperatives. In “The
Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government,” Lenin wrote:
The socialist state can arise only as a network of producers’ and
consumers’ cooperatives, which conscientiously keep account of their
production and consumption, economize on labor, and steadily raise the
productivity of labor.19
Thus, with this quote, Lenin indicated that he did not intend to centralize the economy and
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impose quotas for all enterprises as the first economic policy of the Soviet government.
Even after the exigencies of civil war had forced Lenin to create a command
economy, he still advocated that cooperatives be given the Party’s blessings. At the Eighth
Congress of the Russian Communist Party, which was held in March of 1919, Lenin
asserted that cooperatives needed to be highly encouraged by the Party, and allowed to
conduct their own affairs.20 In that same year Lenin proclaimed:
No Communist, no intelligent socialist, has even entertained the idea of
violence against the middle peasants. All socialists have always spoken
of agreement with them and of their gradual and voluntary transition
to socialism.21
Considering that Lenin made these comments at a time when other Bolsheviks such as
Leon Trotsky were pressing Lenin to impose stricter grain requisitioning policies,22 it can
be argued that Lenin believed in the necessity of establishing voluntary
cooperative societies.
Western Thought on Ideological Traditions Within Marxism-Leninism
Their thoughts on cooperatives notwithstanding, though, Marx and Lenin did not
provide much guidance on how a socialist society should be constructed past the immediate
consolidation of power by the vanguard party. This void in Marxism-Leninism has been
the source of much controversy for both Western Sovietologists and Soviet policy-makers.
One of the main questions that both of these groups of thinkers have had to wrestle with
since the death of Lenin is, “How does, or should, a ruling Communist party use ideology
to guide policy?”
For years, many Western analysts subscribed to the view put forward by Carl
Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, two of the leading advocates of the totalitarian model of
the Soviet system, which holds that Soviet rulers are compelled by their Communist
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convictions to base policy on Marxism-Leninism. In the eyes of Friedrich and Brzezinski,
Marxism-Leninism is an unchanging ideology, which is “focused and projected toward a
perfect final state of mankind,” and is “based upon a radical rejection of the existing society
and conquest of the world for a new one.”23

Applied to the USSR, the “perfect final state of mankind” would be communism,
the “radically rejected existing society” would be czarist Russia, and the “world to be
conquered” for the “new” socialist order would be the capitalist one. Friedrich and
Brzezinski further assert that the employment of violence for the realization of ideological
goals, combined with the rejection of the status quo upon which the ideology is predicated,
ultimately necessitates that Soviet leaders “force reality to fit theory.”24 From these
hypotheses, it is clear that Friedrich and Brzezinski believe that Soviet leaders feel obliged
to base policy on the revolutionary ideology of Marx and Lenin.
However, these totalitarian theorists fail to take a major factor into consideration in
reaching their conclusions about Soviet ideology: the existence of a gradualist tradition
within Marxism-Leninism. One author who makes a strong case for the legitimacy of this
gradualist tradition is Stephen Cohen, an American Sovietologist. In Bukharin and the
Bolshevik Revolution, Cohen argues that following 1921, Bolshevism was “bifurcated by
two conflicting ideological traditions”: revolutionary-heroic and evolutionary-gradualist.25
While recognizing that Marxism-Leninsm possessed a daring and violent past
stemming from the Bolshevik coup of 1917, Cohen also asserts that Lenin bequeathed a
gradualist legacy to Soviet Communists as a result of his economic writings of 1918 and
his NEP literature of the early 1920s. Further, Cohen posits that Nikolai Bukharin, one of
the most influential Bolsheviks following Lenin’s death, best exemplified Lenin’s true
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wishes.26 In fact, Cohen concludes his book by saying that the NEP advocated by Lenin
and Bukharin actually represented “the true preconfiguration of the Communist future.”27
One Western political scientist who attempts to account theoretically for the use of
both ideological traditions within Marxism-Leninism by Communist leaderships is Franz
Schurmann. In Ideology and Organization in Communist China, Schurmann develops the
concepts of pure and practical ideology. According to Schurmann, “pure ideology is a set
of ideas designed to give the individual a unified and conscious world view,” while
“practical ideology is a set of ideas designed to give the individual rational instruments for
action.”28 Schurmann further asserts that pure and practical ideology are inextricably
linked. He writes, “Without pure ideology, the ideas of practical ideology have no
legitimation. But without practical ideology, an organization cannot transform its
weltanschaung into consistent action.”29
Applying Schurmann’s theory to the Soviet Union, the writings of Marx and Lenin
that were devoted to analyzing the inevitable demise of capitalism and describing the final
goal of building communism serve as pure ideology. These writings include both
revolutionary and gradualist elements. In contrast, practical ideology constitutes those
policy justifications used by Soviet leaders which represent logical extensions of these
original theories of Marx and Lenin. Yet, not all policy justifications given by Soviet
leaders can, or should, be considered practical ideology. Those ones which are not rooted
in the writings of Marx and Lenin actually represent ideological perversion
or abandonment.
In fact, it is one of the main contentions of this thesis that Stalin’s collectivization
campaign was one of the most blatant betrayals of the ideals of Marx and Lenin in Soviet
history. As will be recalled from the initial review of the writings of Marx and Lenin on
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cooperation, the two founders of Communist ideology were opposed to complete state
control of cooperatives and the coercion of peasants into worker collectives. Throughout
the rest of this essay, the role of pure and practical ideology in the Soviet policy-making
process will be assessed through the examination of the NEP, the collectivization drive of
the late 1920s, and the current perestroika program. In the final analysis, it will be shown
that the attempts by Bukharin and Gorbachev to develop a strong cooperative sector of the
Soviet economy represented sincere efforts to interpret and implement Marxism-Leninism,
and that Stalin’s militarily enforced reorganization of the peasantry did not.
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CHAPTER II
THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEP

The Events Leading to Lenin’s Advocacy of the NEP
Having discussed the concept of ideology and the Soviet use of MarxismLeninism in general and theoretical terms, it is now appropriate to look closely at a
specific example of how ideology was used to introduce and justify an economic reform
program: the NEP. By identifying the economic and political factors which motivated
Lenin to abandon the policy of War Communism and begin building a market socialist
economy, it will be possible to develop some hypotheses about what sorts of conditions
lead to the supersession of gradualist ideology over revolutionary ideology. Also,
analysis of Bukharin’s attempt to continue the economic liberalization program through
reference to, and elaboration of, Lenin’s works will show how important ideological
fidelity to Marxism-Leninism has been in procuring political support since the first
Soviet leader.
One factor that convinced Lenin of the need for the New Economic Policy (NEP)
in the aftermath of the Russian Civil War was the devastated condition of the Soviet
Union. Between 1914 and 1921, over twenty million people died in the USSR, including
twenty-nine percent of the able-bodied male population. Further, as a result of drought
and poor harvests in 1920 and 1921, millions more died of starvation.1 In comparison to
the figures of 1913, industrial production and coal production in 1920 decreased by
eighty-six percent and sixty-seven percent respectively.2 These drastic reductions in
17
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productivity not only reflected the dire state of the Soviet economy, but they also largely
contributed to the near-complete breakdown of the railway system, the primary means of
state transportation.
This transportation breakdown contributed to the disaffection of various segments
of Soviet society from the Bolshevik government, which was another primary reason
Lenin decided to introduce the NEP. Large numbers of discharged soldiers were left
stranded far from home and poorly provided for by the government. Some of these
former defenders of the revolution, who were often armed, resorted to raiding state
supply centers and stealing from traders to subsist. Further, many of these ex-soldiers
had been drafted from the ranks of industrial workers, the group which the Bolsheviks
had hoped would contribute the most to the construction of the new socialist state. Now,
not only were these one-time industrial workers separated from their means of
production, but they were becoming increasingly skeptical of the intentions and
governmental abilities of the Bolsheviks.3
Popular discontent with the Bolsheviks was hardly limited to displaced soldiers,
however. The wretched urban living conditions had driven many of the industrial
workers who had not been conscripted to the countryside, and, by the end of 1920, their
number had dwindled to 1.5 million— less than one-half of those who had toiled in the
cities in 1917.4 The grain requisitioning policy of the Bolsheviks drew the everincreasing ire of the peasants. Initially, many peasants reacted to this policy by cutting
back their crop production, but, as the Civil War drew to a close, the peasants in some
areas formed military units and fought against both the Reds and the Whites. In the
Tambov region of the Soviet union, one of these peasant militias, which were referred to
as Greens, actually fought for and gained a fair amount of territory before the Red Army
was able to suppress the revolt.5
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The group whose defection from the Bolshevik cause most disturbed Lenin and
influenced him finally to advocate the NEP, though, was that of the Kronstadt sailors.
These sailors had supported the Bolsheviks wholeheartedly since the October Revolution,
but, in the closing days of the Civil War, the Kronstadters became disillusioned with “the
arbitrary rule of the commissars.”6 Inspired by a series of strikes which took place in
Petrograd during February 1921, the sailors on board the Petropavlovsk drafted a
resolution calling for, among other things, freedom of speech, new, democratic soviet
elections in Kronstadt, and expanded ownership rights for peasants.7
Within days, popular support for the Petro-pavlovsJc resolution mushroomed
tremendously. First, 10,000 people participated in a mass demonstration, and then an ad
hoc conference of about 300 sailors, soldiers, and workers was formed. This conference
proceeded to elect a five-man presidium, which soon after ordered the arrest of several
prominent Bolsheviks in the area. Following these arrests, Lenin sent Leon Trotsky, the
Commissar for War, and a detachment of Red Army special forces to suppress this
rebellion. After several days of heavy fighting, Trotsky and his detachment accomplished
their objective on March 18, 1921.8
Although Lenin said that Kronstadt “lit up reality better than anything else,”9 it
has been documented that he proposed the NEP to the Central Committee of the Russian
Communist Party well before the Kronstadt affair.10 When he unveiled the NEP to the
entire Party at the Tenth Congress, which was held shortly after Trotsky’s victory over
the Kronstadters, Lenin revealed that the issue of state grain procurement had been
troubling him for some time. Lenin’s answer to this problem was to introduce a tax in
kind which would provide the peasantry with financial incentive to trade with the state.
Lenin also hoped that the tax in kind would serve as the basis for a strong proletariatpeasantry alliance, or smychka.u
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To Lenin, such a smychka was crucial to the preservation of Bolshevik power and
the development of socialism. In the short term, the smychka was necessary to catalyze
the Soviet economy. The state needed to procure food to feed the industrial workers in
order to keep them in, or lure them back to, the city, and to motivate them to produce
more. To obtain this food, the state had to convince the peasants that it was in their best
interest to trade their grain with the government. In the long run, Lenin hoped that the
smychka could be used to win peasant commitment to socialism. According to Lenin, the
Bolshevik government could gain the political support of the peasants by proving to them
that the state was a reliable trading partner. Further, Lenin argued that the constant
contact between the peasants and the state traders would provide the Bolshevik
government with the opportunity to inculcate socialist values into the peasants.12
Although the Communist party approved Lenin’s resolution at the Tenth
Congress, it was clear that some opposition to the NEP existed within the Bolshevik
leadership.13 Initially, Lenin attempted to eliminate this opposition by ramming through
a ban on Party factionalism at the Tenth Party Congress. However, as time progressed,
Lenin realized that the best way to win support for the NEP, both within the Party and
among the non-Bolshevik intelligentsia, was to provide an ideological justification of it.
(While official explanations of how the NEP would help in the construction of socialism
inspired some peasants and industrial workers, many others believed that true
justification of the NEP would come through improved living conditions and economic
revitalization.) Thus, in May 1921, Lenin wrote and published “The Tax in Kind.”
In this article, Lenin referred to the NEP as a return to the policy of state
capitalism, which the Bolsheviks had intended to implement in 1918, but which they
were forced to abandon because of the exigencies of civil war. In fact, Lenin attempted
to verify this assertion by providing a lengthy excerpt from his 1918 article “The Chief
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Task of Our Day: ‘Left-Wing’ Childishness and the Petty Bourgeois Mentality.” Not
coincidentally, Lenin chose the first paragraph from this excerpt to read:
State capitalism would be a step forward as compared with the present
state of affairs in our Soviet Republic. If in approximately six months’
time state capitalism is established in our Republic, this would be a
great success and a secure guarantee that within a year socialism will
have gained a permanently firm hold and will have become invincible
in this country.14
Throughout the rest of this excerpt, Lenin distinguished between the Bolsheviks and the
petty bourgoisie, and between state capitalism and private capitalism. According to
Lenin, the tendency of the petty bourgeoisie to engage in profiteering and capital
accumulation was inimical to the goal of establishing a state capitalist economy.
Specifically, he felt that the petty bourgeoisie deliberately would invest its financial
assets in socially non-productive ventures to undermine the Bolshevik economic
program; then, the petty bourgeoisie would just wait for the Bolsheviks to relinquish
power to a more pro-capitalist group. To combat this strategy, Lenin proposed that the
state take , and maintain, control of the “commanding heights” of the economy, which
included such things as banking, transportation, and heavy industry. By controlling the
“commanding heights” of the economy, Lenin thought that the Bolshevik government
could provide enough public goods and services to maintain the support of the people.
Also, he theorized that Bolshevik possession of the “commanding heights” would prevent
the petty bourgoisie from accumulating too much capital and employing it against the
fledgling socialist government.15
After establishing that building a state capitalist economy was actually the desired
program of the Bolsheviks before the outbreak of the Civil War, Lenin discussed four
means through which such a policy could be promoted. These means were proBolshevik entrepreneurship, state property leasing, workers’ co-operatives, and joint
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ventures between Western and Soviet economic entities. While Lenin asserted that all of
these non-state-controlled economic forms needed to be developed to help construct
state capitalism, he was particularly adamant about creating a strong cooperative sector.
According to Lenin, cooperarives were an especially desirable component of state
capitalism because of their capacity to “embrace wider masses of the population” and
their ability to “pull up the deeper and more tenacious roots of the old pre-socialist and
even pre-capitalist relations, which most stubbornly resist all ‘innovations.’”16
Several events over the course of the next year and one-half further convinced
Lenin of the promise of cooperatives. First, the NEP greatly helped improve the entire
Soviet economy, and Soviet society was able to begin rebuilding itself.17 Second, foreign
countries and businesses proved to be very reluctant to establish economic ties with the
USSR. Whether they had political or economic reservations about dealing with a
socialist state, these potential foreign investors denied Lenin the opportunity to build state
capitalism with international financial support.18 Finally, the cooperatives which Lenin
had placed great hopes in back in early 1921 began achieving considerable success.
Large numbers of peasants joined cooperatives, and, soon, these cooperatives began
seizing increasingly large shares of retail and wholesale trade.19 In fact, Stephen Cohen
asserted that “by 1922, the cooperatives seemed to be the foremost element of state
capitalism in Russia.”20
These economic events caused Lenin to rethink long-term socialist strategy. He
now believed that cooperatives could serve as a link between state capitalism and
socialism. Lenin also came to recognize the importance of ideologically justifying
economic programs as a result of the considerable support for the NEP that he was able to
gain through the publication of “The Tax In Kind.” Consequently, he decided that it was
imperative to explain the necessity of developing cooperatives in ideological terms.
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Fortunately for Lenin, another Soviet Marxist, A. V. Chayanov, already had devised such
an argument, and Lenin largely based his case for cooperatives on Chayanov’s works.21
Between 1913 and 1915, Chayanov conducted a study of cooperatives, and he
published the results in the Budgets o f Peasants in the StarobeVsk District. One of the
radical conclusions reached by Chayanov was that cooperative farmers based economic
decision-making on different criteria from that used by capitalist farmers, because the
former were simultaneously owners of and workers on their property. Specifically,
Chayanov asserted that while capitalist farmers were primarily concerned with
maximizing profits, cooperative farmers were motivated chiefly by the need to provide
for their families. Because this latter goal was based largely on the cooperative
succeeding, promotion of a social good, albeit limited to the cooperative, was a necessary
byproduct. Applied on a large scale to a chiefly peasant, agrarian country, as Russia was
at the time, cooperatives could lead to socialism.22
With Chayanov’s argument in mind, Lenin wrote “On Cooperation,” his most
impassioned plea for a gradualist approach to socialism. Lenin began this article by
explaining how he and the Bolshevik leadership had underrated grossly the potential of
cooperatives in the transition to socialism. Next, he reiterated Chayanov’s primary
reason for the likelihood of cooperatives leading to the development of socialism—their
ability to channel private interest towards a collective good. Then, however, Lenin
introduced a new reason for promoting cooperatives, and this was that the conditions
existed under which Marx had asserted that cooperatives could lead to socialism.
Specifically, the proletariat now controlled the political system and could expand
cooperation on a nationwide scale.23 Thus, having provided Chayanov’s empirical
evidence and Marx’s theoretical hypothesis in defense of his new position, Lenin boldly
proclaimed that “the system of civilized cooperators is the system of socialism.”24
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Almost as important to the continued existence of cooperatives during the
formative years of the Soviet republic as was Lenin’s ideological justification, was
Lenin’s realistic prognosis of what cooperatives would need to succeed and how long it
would take for them to become genuinely socialist. In “On Cooperation,” Lenin urged
the Bolsheviks to give cooperatives “more than ordinary assistance.” Specifically, he
recommended that cooperatives be given preferential loans, material incentives, and
official state endorsement.25 Even given this type of support, Lenin recognized that it
would take “a whole historical epoch to get the entire population into the work of
cooperatives through NEP,” because the whole nation needed to be culturally educated.26
Taken by itself, “On Cooperation” served as an enthusiastic ideological defense of
and recommendation for cooperatives. But viewed in conjunction with a series of articles
that Lenin wrote in the last year of his life, it actually represented one of the major
components of the first Soviet leader’s political testament. In these articles, which
included “Pages from a Diary,” “Our Revolution,” “How We Should Re-organize
Rabkrin,” “Better Fewer, But Better, “ and “Letters to the Congress,” Lenin proposed
such specific policy actions as the introduction of universal public education, the
reduction of state bureaucracy, and the reorganization of the Party elite to promote the
development of the NEP 27
But, more importantly, throughout all of these articles, Lenin stressed the need to
strengthen the smychka between the proletariat and the peasantry, and advocated that this
be done by appealing to the interests of the latter group, and not by coercing them to
become communists immediately. Lenin was particularly adamant about this point in
“Pages from a Diary.” In this article, he wrote:
We must start by establishing contacts between town
and country without the preconceived aim of implanting
communism in the rural districts. It is an aim which
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cannot be achieved at the present time. It is
inopportune, and to set an aim like that at the present
time would be harmful, instead of useful, to the cause.28
This quote , which was representative of the conciliatory tone of Lenin’s last works,
indicates rather clearly the first Soviet leader’s desire for the Bolsheviks to pursue a
gradualist approach to socialism.
Attempts to Execute Lenin’s Testament
Following Lenin’s death, numerous Soviet theorists attempted to bolster
ideologically the late leader’s case for cooperatives and a gradualist approach to
socialism. One such theorist was A. V. Chayanov, the pioneering Marxist economist
whose early work on cooperatives significantly influenced Lenin. Chayanov further
developed his argument by stressing the advantages that cooperatives could offer to a
socialist economy in its infancy. Specifically, he argued that cooperatives could develop
immunity to, and actually help to eradicate, capitalist threats such as worker exploitation
and hostile buyouts. The members of co-operatives naturally contributed to these goals
by collectively deciding how to use accrued profits and by pooling their financial
resources to compete effectively with capitalist landowners. Chayanov also explained
how a socialist government, with its control of heavy industry, could help cooperatives
modernize and develop into socialism.29
Another theorist who championed the cooperative cause was L.N. Kritsman, one
of the leading theorists of the Agrarian-Marxist school of development in the 1920’s.
Kritsman based his argument on the support Marx and Lenin had expressed for Russian
cooperatives. Kritsman discerned three facts which led him to believe that cooperatives
could be used to help build socialism in the Soviet Union. First, cooperatives were an
indigenous peasant phenomenon in Russia. Second, under Marxist guidance,
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cooperatives could easily be transformed into socialist institutions. Finally, co
operatives represented the simplest, most painless ways for peasants to grow into
socialism.30 For these reasons, Kritsman advocated that the Bolsheviks continue to
promote cooperatives and work to fulfill the prophesies of Marx and Lenin.
Although the contributions of Chayanov and Kritsman were significant to the
promotion of cooperatives, it was the arguments put forward by Nikolai Bukharin, a
Politburo member and the editor of Pravda, which most influenced Soviet policy in the
1920s. Bukharin sought to prove his ideological fidelity to Lenin and create a theory for
the socialist development of cooperatives which would win the lasting support of the
Bolsheviks and the Soviet workers. He began this quest by giving a rousing memorial
speech on Lenin’s contribution to Marxism to the Communist Academy in February of
1924. In his speech, Bukharin praised Lenin for stressing the importance of the
proletariat-peasantry smychka, arguing that “Lenin (had) bequeathed an original theory
of ‘agrarian-cooperative’ socialism.”31 It was this legacy which led Bukharin to
conclude that NEP Russia must “grow into socialism through an evolutionary period of
development.”32
Having lent ideological credibility to his case for a gradualist approach to
socialism, Bukharin attempted to devise a Marxist theoretical justification of
cooperatives. In “Concerning the New Economic Policy and Our Tasks,” Bukharin
explained how cooperatives differed in capitalist and socialist societies, a problem which
had been posed to NEP advocates by Marxist critics inside and outside the USSR.
Bukharin asserted that in capitalist societies, cooperatives developed ties with capitalist
institutions such as banks and industrial firms, and inevitably acquired capitalist mind
sets. Contrarily, in socialist societies, cooperatives built ties with socialist institutions,
and, therefore, developed socialist perspectives. Thus, Bukharin argued that while all
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cooperatives possessed inherent collectivist tendencies, only in socialist societies would
these tendencies be developed to their fullest; in capitalist societies, these tendencies
would be stifled or perverted to the extent that cooperatives would become merely the
tools of exploitative capitalists.33
Recognizing that it was necessary to appeal to the to the peasants’ economic
interests to get them to join and work diligently for the cooperatives, Bukharin advocated
that the socialist government establish an exchange system between socialist institutions
and cooperatives which provided the latter with maximum benefits. According to
Bukharin, the state bank needed to provide the cooperatives with preferential credit so
that they could purchase machinery from the state industrial sector.34 This policy would
not only benefit the entire economy by providing state industry with a large outlet for its
goods and allowing the cooperatives to become more efficient through better technology,
but it also would foster strong ties between state financial institutions and the
cooperatives. In fact, Bukharin theorized that these ties would result in peasant growth
“into the economic organization of the proletarian dictatorship” and gradual incorporation
“into the system of socialist relations.”35
Bukharin’s argument initially won Bolshevik support for cooperatives, and for
himself as co-leader with Josef Stalin. This was evidenced by the fact that even
Bolsheviks such as Leon Trotsky and Yevgeny Preobrazhensky who argued that the
Soviet Union needed to industrialize more rapidly than Bukharin advocated, agreed with
the Soviet co-leader that a gradualist approach to socialism needed to be pursued.36
Also, in 1925, Stalin himself said, “We (the Bolsheviks) stand, and we shall stand, for
Bukharin.”37 Further, Bukharin’s writings provided the reassurance about the state’s
commitment to the NEP necessary to convince many peasants to join or form
cooperatives. By 1927, the number of operating cooperatives had increased by over 100
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percent since 1921, and nearly one-third of all peasant households belonged to a
cooperative.38 Also, in comparison to the figures for the 1922-1923 period, the amount
of retail trade garnered by cooperatives in the 1926-1927 period was 19 times greater,
and it marked the first time in Soviet history that cooperatives garnered a larger share of
retail trade than did the state or private traders.39
The NEP in Perspective
At this time, it is useful to identify several facts about the Soviet use of ideology
which the preceding examination of the NEP has revealed. First, victory in the Civil
War, existence of a worsening economic crisis, and increasing popular malaise made
advocacy of a gradualist ideology a desirable and necessary choice for the Bolshevik
Party. Second, the Bolshevik leadership developed this gradualist component of
Marxism-Leninism as a way of facilitating the construction of socialism in Russia, which
was comprised largely of peasants and not industrial workers. Third, ideology served as a
source of motivation for both Lenin and Bukharin, and it was used to justify policies and
activate the masses. Finally, two specific techniques were used to attribute legitimacy to
particular aspects of ideological development. One method was to make reference to
Marx, as Lenin did, or to Lenin, as subsequent theorists did. The other way that Soviet
leaders and scholars attempted to prove ideological fidelity to Marxism-Leninism was to
show how a particular policy contributed to the eventual creation of a socialist society.
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CHAPTER m
Collectivization and Its Consequences

A Change in Soviet Priorities
As demonstrated by the fact that in 1926 grain harvests and industrial production
had returned approximately to their pre-war levels, the NEP had improved Soviet
economic performance.1 However, several events in 1927 caused Bukharin and Stalin to
modify the methods and the goals of the NEP. First, the thwarting of a Communist
uprising in China and a subsequent reactionary backlash in Western Europe worried the
Soviet leadership that hostile capitalist powers might try to crush the world’s first
socialist government. This threat of war convinced Bukharin and Stalin that a more rapid
industrialization drive was needed to provide the state with sufficient means to defend the
USSR.
To inspire the Soviet people to support and contribute to the industrialization
drive, the leadership spoke in dark and urgent terms about the need to “catch up and
surpass” the capitalist countries industrially. These alarmist speeches had the un\

intended effect of unleashing widespread hoarding during the summer and early fall of
1927. Making matters worse, many peasants chose not to sell their produce to the state
during the fall because they could obtain better prices from Nepmen, or private traders,
and because of the dearth of cheap goods available to purchase from the state.2
Consequently, as a result of hoarding and poor state produce procurement, a grain crisis
developed.
32
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At the end of 1927, Bukharin and Stalin devised a plan which they believed would
provide the state with the means to achieve both rapid industrialization and increased
grain acquisition. This two-pronged plan called for greater state investment in heavy and
light industry and the allocation of industrial resources from central authorities. By
investing more in light industry, and by raising grain prices, the state hoped to improve its
trading relationship with the peasantry. In addition to facilitating the creation of
affordable goods that the peasantry demanded, the Soviet co-leaders thought that their
new industrial policy would contribute to the development of heavy industry, which they
felt was critical to the defense capability of the USSR. Further, they believed that state
participation in the industrial appropriation process would promote full resource
utilization and means of obtaining desired growth rates.3
While limited central planning certainly was a primary feature of this new
industrial policy, Bukharin made it clear that he did not want a return to War
Communism. He did so by demanding that three criteria be met in the establishment and
implementation of an industrial plan. First, target figures were to be devised according to
scientific calculation and not the arbitrary will of political leaders or planners. Second,
proportionality between light and heavy industry would be one of the most important
considerations in the minds of the plan’s decision-makers. Finally, the planning targets,
once reached, would serve as flexible guidelines and not mandatory decrees.4
At the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU, which was held in December 1927,
Bukharin’s requests were honored; general directives— not mandatory quotas— were
presented and ratified. Also at the Fifteenth Party Congress, however, the seeds for
forced collectivization were planted in the form of an adopted resolution calling for the
unification and transformation of small peasant farms into large collectives to be one of
the Party’s main tasks during the next five years. When speaking on this resolution at the
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congress, Bukharin issued warnings against overzealous implementation of this new
Party policy.5 On this subject, he was emphatic that collectivization should not be
accomplished through “hysterical maneuvering” or from “shots from a revolver.”6
According to Bukharin, individual peasant house-holds could be convinced to
join larger, more efficient production cooperatives through financial incentives.
Believing that the successful policy the Bolsheviks had used to encourage peasants to join
marketing cooperatives could be applied equally as well to production cooperatives, he
advocated that the state provide production cooperatives with preferential access to state
loans and state technology. Further, he proposed that direct monetary inducements be
given to individuals who joined or formed production cooperatives. While Bukharin
supported the gradual development of production cooperatives, he wholly opposed the
idea that this could be achieved at the expense of individual middle peasants or marketing
cooperatives. In fact, he argued that these three types of economic entities should coexist
for “several decades.”7
However, Bukharin had come to think much less favorably about one particular
form of private producers: the kulaks. Their decision to sell their relatively large amounts
of grain to Nepmen instead of the state in the fall of 1927 had shaken Bukharin’s belief
that they could “grow into socialism.” Thus, whereas he had told all peasants to “enrich
yourselves” in 1925, Bukharin now asserted that a “forced offensive against the kulak”
should be initiated to “limit his exploitive tendencies.”8 But Bukharin urged that this
offensive should be a peaceful one designed only to deprive the kulaks of their primary
means of profiteering. Specifically, he recommended that kulaks be subjected to heavier
taxation, stricter laws on hiring and land leasing procedures, and reduced voting
privileges in land societies to which they belonged.9
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Stalin’s Manipulation of the Grain Crisis
Although it is apparent from the previous discussion that Bukharin favored noncoercive behavior modification of the kulaks, events in early 1928 compelled him to
retreat from this position. During the first weeks in January, the grain crisis became
acute. The state possessed only 52 percent of the grain that it had at the same time in
1927, and shortages were becoming severe throughout the Soviet Union.10 In order to
feed the hungry Soviet people, the Politburo unanimously voted to enact “extraordinary”
measures. Under these “extraordinary” measures, Soviet authorities were allowed to fine
and prosecute speculators and to confiscate their hoarded grain.11
When Bukharin and his primary Politburo allies, Aleksei Rykov and Mikhail
Tomsky, agreed to support this emergency policy urged by Stalin, they believed that it
would be applied only temporarily, and that it would be aimed at kulaks almost
exclusively.12 However, Stalin, to whom responsibility for execution of this policy was
given, interpreted the “extraordinary” measures in a totally different way. Viewing the
unanimous Politburo vote as a mandate to begin carrying out the collectivization drive
prescribed at the Fifteenth Party Congress, Stalin commanded local Party officials to
seize grain by all necessary means. To ensure that these orders were being followed, he
personally traveled to Siberia to oversee the administration of the “extraordinary”
measures.
In Siberia, Stalin initiated a comprehensive collectivization campaign, which
would later serve as the model for nationwide collectivization. After listening to local
Party officials assert that the main problem they faced in obtaining grain from peasants
was the low state purchasing prices, Stalin removed them from their posts. He then
formed armed requisitioning squads, who proceeded to seize grain and arrest peasants
arbitrarily. Stalin also closed private farmer’s markets and began forcing peasants into
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communes. Soon this institutionalized terror began to yield results, and Stalin departed
Siberia. Before leaving, however, Stalin warned the purged and demoralized Siberian
Party organization that it had better continue to collect large quantities of grain or risk
further reorganization by Moscow.13
Upon returning to Moscow, Stalin was confronted by an outraged Politburo
headed by Bukharin. While re-affirming their support for the resolution on “extra
ordinary” measures, they chastised Stalin for harassing innocent middle peasants as well
as kulaks, for using an unnecessary amount of force, and for upsetting local market
relations. Further, Bukharin and his allies became much more closely involved in
implementation of the policy. Directives sent to local Party officials included strong
condemnations of “excesses” and resolute denials that the “extraordinary” measures were
intended to renew War Communism and end the NEP.14 Also, A.I. Mikoyan, Stalin’s
right-hand man in the grain procurement drive, was asked by the Politburo to write an
article for Pravda explaining the adverse effect which the agricultural campaign in
Siberia had on peasant-proletariat relations. In this article, Mikoyan asserted that many
of the activities of the armed requisitioning squads were “harmful, unlawful, and
inadmissible.”15
These official pronouncements, combined with mild application of the
“extraordinary” measures and increased state grain purchasing prices, helped the
Bolsheviks reestablish decent relations with the middle peasants. The state continued to
obtain sufficient levels of grain, and, at the April CPSU Central Committee Plenum,
Stalin declared that “the crisis had been averted.”16 Following this proclamation, the
“extraordinary” measures were suspended. However, just a few short weeks later, a
series of natural and man-made problems forced the Party to reactivate the measures to
avert agricultural disaster and widespread famine.
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First, an unusually severe winter resulted in the destruction of much wheat in the
Ukraine and the North Caucasus. Due to this fact, these regions required the state to
provide them with grain supplies and resources to resow their land. Ordinarily, the
amount of wheat that the state had acquired during the winter and early spring of 1928
would have allowed it to deliver the necessary quantity to the two hard-hit regions. But,
because Stalin’s centralized implementation of the “extraordinary” measures deprived
many farm regions of the grain ordinarily sold to them by local peasants, the state was
forced to distribute grain to many places which previously had been self-sufficient. Also,
the local Party organizations across the Soviet Union had relaxed their grain procurement
drives following the suspension of the “extraordinary” measures, and the resulting drop,
modest though it was, contributed to the worsening of the situation.17
This unexpected grain shortage further eroded Stalin’s confidence in the reliability
of individual peasant farmers. He even went so far as to say that the Soviet Union could
“no longer make progress on the basis of the small individual peasant economy.”18 In a
speech which he gave at the Moscow Institute of Red Professors in late May, Stalin
asserted that the country could move towards socialism only by making the “transition
from individual peasant farming to collective, common farming.”19 In Bukharin’s view,
these words indicated that Stalin was contemplating renewing and accelerating the
collectivization campaign that he had begun in Siberia in January.
To prevent Stalin from taking this course of action, Bukharin attempted to alert
the other members of the Politburo to the dangers which Stalin’s actions and public
statements represented. In a series of letters to these members, Bukharin argued that
Stalin had increased the severity of the “extraordinary” measures since their reactivation,
and that, as a consequence, the peasant-proletariat smychka was threatened. Bukharin
also claimed that Stalin’s talk of a “class war” against kulaks and a “sudden leap toward
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collectivization” in speeches and journal articles called into question whether the General
Secretary was preparing to initiate a second socialist revolution which would bring the
NEP to a close. Denouncing both of these developments as abandonments of MarxismLeninism, Bukharin requested that these issues be discussed at the upcoming CPSU
Central Committee Plenum in July.20
The Political Battle Between Bukharin and Stalin
In response to these letters, Stalin mobilized his supporters in the Central
Committee, and the July Plenum became the battleground for a decisive showdown
between Bukharin and the General Secretary. Asserting that the price-raising proposal
on grain put forward by two Bukharinist supporters represented a capitulation to the
kulaks, Stalin claimed that such concessions were the ideas of “peasant philosophers” and
not “Marxists or Leninists.”21 The following day, Bukharin addressed the comments
made by Stalin and argued that Lenin himself had made market relations between the
peasants and the state the basis of the smychka during the NEP, and he reaffirmed
Lenin’s belief that the Party “must in no case allow a threat to the smychka.”22
Bukharin’s speech convinced the Central Committee of the necessity of
maintaining good relations with the peasantry, and, consequently, they voted to raise
grain prices, to terminate the “extraordinary measures,” and to pronounce publicly the
Party’s support for the continuation of the NEP. However, as the Plenum was drawing to
a close, rumors circulated that Stalin had yielded in his demands for an accelerated
collectivization campaign only because he did not have quite the strength within the
Central Committee at the time to discredit Bukharin and his allies completely.23
One month after the Plenum, though, Stalin launched a political assault on
Bukharin’s allies. The General Secretary began this offensive by having the prosmychka editors of Pravda and the Bolshevik removed from their posts. Next, Stalin
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attacked the Party leadership of Moscow, which had expressed strong opposition to
forced collectivization proposals.24 In an address to a special meeting of the Moscow
Central Committee, Stalin demanded that a “relentless fight against the Right, opportunist
danger in our Party” be waged because “the triumph of the right deviation in our Party
would unleash the forces of capitalism (and) undermine the revolutionary positions of the
proletariat.”25 Less than a month after this speech, Moscow district secretaries recently
appointed by Stalin pressured Nikolai Uglanov, the city’s Party boss, to recant for Right
deviations.
Following his shake-up of the Moscow Party organization, Stalin sought to wrest
control of the Trade Unions from Mikhail Tomsky, one of Bukharin’s strongest
supporters on the Politburo. Using his powers as General Secretary, Stalin appointed
many of his allies to the Party caucus for the Eighth Trade Union Congress. These
delegates succeeded in placing a resolution urging complete union support for a heavy
industrialization drive in the Congress platform against the wishes of Tomsky, who
claimed that the proposal could “victimize the working class and transform unions into
houses of detention.”26 Once the Congress actually approved the resolution and voted
five Stalinists onto the Central Trade Union Council, Tomsky submitted his resignation
as chairman of this body.27
The Revelation of the Ideological Split
Tomsky’s resignation was the act that most convinced Bukharin that action had to
be taken to prevent Stalin from completely removing gradualists from the policy-making
process and abandoning the NEP. Choosing the fifth anniversary of Lenin’s death to
make his dire appeal to CPSU Central Committee members, Bukharin composed an
article entitled “Lenin’s Political Testament.” In this article, Bukharin stated Lenin’s case
for the NEP. Specifically, Bukharin recounted how Lenin repeatedly had asserted that
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the construction of Soviet socialism was dependent on good relations between the
proletariat and the peasantry and on the development of capital accumulation and
industrialization proceeding “on the healthy base of expanding market relations.”28
Following the publication of this article, many of Stalin’s supporters publicly
condemned Bukharin for portraying Lenin as “a common peasant philosopher.”29
Around the same time that the controversy over this article was rising, Stalin happened to
learn about Bukharin’s secret meeting with Kamenev in July 1922. With this discovery,
Stalin sought to discredit Bukharin further. He convened a special joint meeting of the
Politburo and the leaders of the Central Control Commission to discuss Bukharin’s
alleged “factional activity.” At this meeting, Stalin accused Bukharin of masterminding a
“right-opportunist, capitulatory platform” and conspiring to form “an anti-Party bloc
with the Trotskyists.”30
Prepared for just these sorts of charges, Bukharin responded by presenting a
thirty-page counter-indictment of Stalin. In this lengthy report, Bukharin asserted that
Stalin had attempted to “implant bureaucratism and establish a personal regime inside the
Party.” According to Bukharin, Stalin’s power politics made it impossible for problems
to be debated earnestly and resolved rationally, and it was because of these “abnormal
conditions” that Bukharin met with Kamenev to gain the latter’s cooperation in exposing
Stalin as an aspiring dictator.31
Bukharin’s spirited and organized self-defense took the Politburo members and
Central Control Commission leaders by surprise. The group established a small
commission to investigate both sets of charges. This commission, which was comprised
largely of Stalinists, decided that if Bukharin retracted his indictment against Stalin and
acknowledged that he had committed a “political error” in meeting with Kamemev, he
need not be censured. However, Bukharin rejected this solution because he realized that
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his “confession” would be used by Stalin either to force him to accept the super
industrialization program or to expel him entirely from the political process. Bukharin’s
decision infuriated the entire body of jurors involved in the case, and, on February 9, they
strongly censured him for his “factional activity.”32
With this major victory in hand, Stalin lobbied for the adoption of a five-year
plan emphasizing collectivization and rapid industrialization at the Central Committee
Plenum in April. In a speech to the Central Committee, Stalin asserted, “We (the Party)
must develop our industry to the utmost as the principal source from which agriculture
will be supplied with the means for its reconstruction.”33 Additionally, Stalin asserted
that “whipping up the tempo of the development of agriculture” was dependent on
“amalgamating scattered peasant farms into large farms, into collective farms.”34
In his speech, Stalin challenged Bukharin both as a political leader and as a
Marxist theoretician. Stalin criticized Bukharin for his proposal that Soviet agriculture be
bolstered through “market normalization” and the “development of individual peasant
farming.” According to Stalin, the result of such a strategy would be “to reduce the rate
of development of industry and to undermine the new forms of the bond (between the
peasantry and the proletariat).”35 Labeling Bukharin a Right deviationist, Stalin
criticized him for asserting that kulaks could grow into socialism. In Stalin’s opinion,
such a hypothesis contradicted the Marxist theory of class struggle. The Central
Committee members subsequently voted to remove Bukharin as chief editor of Pravda
and General Secretary of the Comintern and by approving Stalin’s five-year plan.36
The Implications and Effects of Bukharin’s Ouster
By effectively denying Bukharin any forum to voice opposition to forced
collectivization and placing his thought outside of the Marxist tradition, Stalin obtained
the power to redefine Soviet ideology concerning agriculture. Whereas prior to the
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silencing of Bukharin, the NEP had been perceived as means of building socialism, Stalin
now claimed that it “was not only a retreat (from socialism), but also the preparation for a
new, determined offensive against the capitalist elements in town and country.”37
Stalin’s revision of Lenin’s agricultural directives included a greatly increased
differentiation between types of cooperatives. Stalin evaluated cooperatives in terms of
the privatization which existed within them. Judging according to this criteria, he
condemned the prostye and TOZ forms of cooperatives, which were the types that Lenin
had expressed much hope about in his last writings, because they allowed private
ownership of livestock, dwellings, light equipment, and even some land.38
Stalin expressed more optimism in the artel form of cooperative because it began
the process of the socialization of the means of production. However, the fact that
members of the artel were paid according to their work done disturbed Stalin’s sense of
egalitarianism. Because the kommuna form of cooperative provided for equal salaries,
collective organization of the farm, and collective ownership of property, it received
Stalin’s highest blessing.39 In fact, once Stalin initiated his second collectivization
campaign in late 1930, the kommuna became the model for the kolkhoz, or collective
farm. By the end of 1936, almost 90 percent of the peasant households had been
incorporated into these types of collective farms.40
However, this massive collectivization was achieved only at great economic and
political cost. Following the herding of millions of peasants onto collective farms in
1931 and 1932, mass confusion and hysteria arose among these coerced farmers. Owing
to the rough treatment, low pay, and lack of state guidance concerning proper division of
labor that they received from the state, peasants on many collective farms began
slaughtering much of the livestock for their own personal consumption. To stop this
phenomenon, Stalin had severe legislation adopted which made pilfering of kolkhoz

43
property punishable by “the maximum means of social defense, shooting, or in case of
extenuating circumstances, deprivation of freedom for not less than ten years, with
confiscation of all property.”41
Stalin’s strict policy did not contribute to the improvement of the agricultural
situation. In fact, the harsh law only further demoralized the peasants as evidenced by the
fact that they left 13 percent of the summer crop unharvested.42 Infuriated by this
performance, Stalin decreed that regions which failed to meet their 1932 grain quotas
would cease to be provided with state commodities. When it became apparent that this
threat still would not result in the fulfillment of the grain quota, Stalin ordered that the
law against kolkhoz pilfering be enforced to a greater extent and that state authorities
seize the necessary amounts of grain to meet the 1932 planned figure. These combined
actions allowed the state to obtain a minimally acceptable quantity of grain, but resulted
in the deaths of millions of peasants.43
The severity and costliness of these grain requisitioning tactics caused numerous
Bolsheviks, including several long-time Politburo allies of Stalin, to question the
correctness of collectivization.44 Stalin seized upon the mysterious assassination of one
of these individuals, Sergei Kirov, a Politburo member and Leningrad Party chief, to
strike a death blow to all those people who represented a threat his power as General
Secretary and to his plans for the continued rapid construction of socialism. Portraying
Kirov’s murder as the first act in a Trotskyite conspiracy to eliminate the Stalinist
leadership, Stalin began to try his former political opponents for treason.
In the first such trial, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and fourteen other members of the
defeated Left opposition were forced to confess to conspiracy and to implicate the leaders
of the scorned Right deviation group. Their accusations led to the trial of Bukharin,
Rykov, and nineteen other Right deviationists. All twenty-one defendants in this second
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trial were found guilty and sentenced to death by firing squad.45 With Bukharin’s
execution, Stalin had silenced permanently the last of his former opponents and served
notice to all that the slightest deviation from the Stalinist line was a capital offense.
A Retrospective Evaluation of Stalinism
From the preceding account of the development of Stalin’s collectivization
program, it is evident that Bukharin did not support the institutionalization of state grain
requistioning and the establishment of inflexible grain quotas that Stalin eventually
implemented. Further, it should be noted that Bukharin expressed his complete
opposition to the idea of coercing peasants to join collective farms. Most importantly,
though, it is necessary to recognize how and why Bukharin disputed these Stalinist
policies. Specifically, he objected to the creation of a socialism in which voluntary
cooperatives had no place. Consequently, he defended his cause by reiterating Lenin’s
repeated calls for the promotion of co-operatives and spoke of the dangers that
collectivization could have on Soviet agriculture. Although his warnings proved to be
prophetic, they also contributed to his demise.
Stalin chose to overcome Bukharin’s opposition to collectivization by politically
isolating him and portraying him as non-Marxist theorist and an anti-Leninist
conspirator. After successfully removing Bukharin from the policy-making process and
discrediting his gradualist program, Stalin introduced his alternative strategy for building
socialism in the USSR. Specifically, he called for rapid industrialization and forced
collectivization. In advocating such policies, Stalin implicitly rejected Lenin’s
recommendation for long-term implementation of the NEP and Marx’s warning against
coercing peasants to join worker collectives. For this reason, Stalin’s industrialization
and collectivization campaigns should be regarded as major deviations from MarxismLeninism.

45

ENDNOTES
1 In 1926, 76.8 million tons of grain were harvested and 11,083,000 rubles worth
of industrial goods were produced. The corresponding figures for 1913 were 80.1 million
tons of grain and 10,251,000 rubles worth of industrial goods. For these and other
economic comparisons, see Alec Nove, An Economic History o f the USSR, 2d ed
(London: Penguin Books, 1989), p. 84.
2 Stephen Cohen provides a thorough discussion of the relationship between the
war scare and the grain crisis of 1927 in Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1973), pp. 263-264.
3 Cohen analyzes the motivation behind the new industrial plan conceived by
Bukharin and Stalin in late 1927 in Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, pp. 244—247.
4 Ibid.
5 R.W. Davies evaluates Bukharin’s qualified support for cautionary statements
regarding the Party’s resolution on work in the countryside at the Fifteenth Congress of the
CPSU in The Socialist Offensive (London: MacMillan Press, 1980), p. 38.
6 Quoted in Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, p. 250.
7 Cohen traces the evolution in Bukharin’s thinking on agricultural production
cooperatives in Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, pp. 250-251.
8 Quoted in Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, p. 250.
9 Ibid.
10 Davies gives a month-by-month account of the grain procurement drive
between 1926 and 1930 in The Socialist Offensive, pp. 427-429.
11 Cohen describes how the Politburo reached its decision to enact the
“extraordinary” measures and exactly what these measures were in Bukharin and the
Bolshevik Revolution, p. 278.
12 Ibid.
13 Cohen details Stalin’s tumultuous trip to Siberia and Bukharin’s reaction to it in
Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, pp. 278-279.
*4 Ibid.
15 Quoted in Moshe Lewin, Russian Peasants and the Soviet Power (London:
Allen and Unwin LTD, 1968), p. 231.
16 Ibid., p. 239.

46

17 Lewin assesses the factors contributing to the dire grain situation faced by the
Bolsheviks in the late spring of 1928 in Russian Peasants and, Soviet Power, pp. 238-239.
18 Quoted in Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, p. 279.
19 Quoted in Robert V. Daniels, “The Struggle with the Right Opposition,” in
Foundations o f Soviet Totalitarianism (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath Company, 1965), p. 24.
20 Cohen discusses the content and the impact of Bukharin’s letters on Soviet
policy-making in Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, p. 285.
21 Quoted in Daniels, “The Right Opposition,” p. 26 .
22 Ibid., p. 28.
23 Cohen chronicles the proceedings which occurred at the July plenum in
Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, pp. 289-291.
24 Daniels describes Stalin’s attacks on Bukharin’s supporters in “The Right
Opposition,” pp. 32-33.
25 Quoted in Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, p. 298.
26 Ibid., p.

301.

27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p.

303.

29 Ibid., p.

304.

30 Ibid., pp. 304-305.
31 Ibid., p.

305.

32 Ibid., p.

307.

33 Josef Stalin, “The Right Deviation in the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union,” in Selected Writings (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1970), p. 110.
34 Ibid., p.

109.

35 Ibid., p.

112.

36 Cohen provides an account of the events which took place at the April Plenum in
Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, pp. 311-312.
37 Josef Stalin, “The Problems of Agrarian Policy in the USSR,” in Selected
Writings, p. 164.

47

38 Lewin distinguishes between cooperative types in Russian Peasants and Soviet
Power, pp. 529-534, and Nove explains the criteria that Stalin used in evaluating them in
Economic History o f the USSR, pp. 153-172.
39 Ibid.
40 Nove, Economic History o f the USSR, p. 163.
41 Quoted from the 1932 Soviet Criminal Code in Nove, Economic History o f the
USSR, p. 166.
42 Nove provides this statistic in Economic History o f the USSR, p. 167.
43 Comparing recent Soviet and Western figures for the deaths resulting from
deportation and starvation in the early 1930’s, Nove estimates that 6 million peasants died
as a result of Stalin’s policies. See Nove, Economic History o f the USSR, p. 170.
44 Cohen discusses the wide-ranging opposition to the excesses of Stalin’s
collectivization campaign which began to manifest itself during 1932 in Bukharin and the
Bolshevik Revolution, pp. 343-346.
45 David MacKenzie and Michael Curren evaluate the validity of the charges
brought against the defendants in each of Stalin’s show trials in A History o f Russia and
the Soviet Union (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1986), pp. 634—637.

CHAPTER IV
PERESTROIKA: A RETURN TO MARKET SOCIALISM

Economic Stagnation Under Brezhnev
During the latter part of the Brezhnev regime, the adverse effects of Stalin’s super
industrialization and forced collectivization policies became increasingly apparent. After
decades of maintaining high economic growth rates, the USSR experienced a precipitous
decline in this statistic in the late 1970s. In contrast to the 7.7 percent Net Material Product
growth rate achieved by the Soviet government for the 1966-1970 period, the figure for
the 1976-1980 period was only 4.2 percent. Comparing the growth rates for gross
industrial output and gross agricultural output for the same two time periods reveals a
similar trend: the former dropped from 8.5 percent to 4.4 percent and the latter decreased
from 3.9 percent to 1.7 percent.1
The primary cause of this deterioration in growth rates was the declining
productivity of resources, and the main reason for the latter phenomenon was the lack of
incentive offered by the command-administrative system built by Stalin. Enterprises were
discouraged from devising more effective ways of producing goods by the multiple levels
of authority which had to approve proposed innovations and determine how to incorporate
them into the plans of the enterprise. On the other hand, individuals were deterred from
working as industriously as possible with the means actually at their disposal by the fact
that there would be few worthwhile consumer goods on which to spend their bonus
because of the government’s continued emphasis on heavy industry and military spending.
Further, workers recognized that increased enterprise productivity would result in the
raising of target figures for the enterprise in the next plan.2
48
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The problems which the lack of incentives and autonomy caused in the field of
Soviet agriculture were especially troublesome to the Brezhnev regime. Because the state
paid farm workers a predetermined low wage that was based on greatly subsidized
consumer food prices, farmers were not motivated to give 100 percent effort to harvesting.
Inflexible plan dictates also discouraged farmers from working efficiently because the state
told them what, when, where, and how to produce agricultural goods. Because
unpredictable weather and mechanical failures with farm equipment were not factored into
the plan, considerable waste and target shortfalls resulted.3
Consequently, the government decided to invest heavily in the agricultural sector.
For the 1971-1975 period, the state increased agriculture’s share of the total budget to 26.2
percent, and, for the 1976-1980 period, agriculture was allotted 33 percent of the entire
budget.4 However, most of this investment was directed toward upgrading equipment and
not improving farmers’ salaries. As a result, farmers chose not to work as diligently as
possible, and the agricultural situation did not really improve. This was evidenced by the
fact that, despite the large investment in agriculture, the Soviet government had to allocate
40 percent of its hard-currency import spending on food goods.5
Gorbachev’s Contributions as Agricultural Secretary
In 1978, Brezhnev promoted a relatively young Party First Secretary from the
Stavropol region to the position of CPSU Central Committee Secretary, and put him in
charge of agriculture. This new secretary’s name was Mikhail Gorbachev, and he soon
presented the Central Committee with a proposal for reinvigorating the agricultural sector.
Specifically, he recommended that collective farms be allowed to allot plots of land to
groups of farm families. By giving them the necessary equipment, material, and freedom
to raise livestock or crops, and offering them bonuses for whatever they produced above
their contractual quota to the collective, Gorbachev hoped to re-instill a sense of autonomy
and industriousness in these farm families.6 Believing that this idea carried some merit, the
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Central Committee adopted a decree empowering the managers of collective farms to
distribute land to farm families.7
Although it took some time before this decree was implemented on a wide scale by
farm managers, by 1981 the contribution of farm families to state food production
increased significantly. For that year, the output yielded by farm families constituted 25
percent of Soviet food production and represented the largest amount contributed by semiautonomous entities in the post-Stalin era.8 Unfortunately for Gorbachev, part of the
reason that these zvenos (“normless links”) accounted for such a relatively large portion of
total food production was that actual agricultural output was considerably below the target
figure for 1981.9
This shortfall convinced Gorbachev that a critical analysis of Soviet agriculture
needed to be conducted. Consequently, he convened a conference of agricultural
specialists in April of 1982. The boldest critiques of Soviet agriculture presented at this
conference were given by Tatyana Zaslavskaya and Vladimir Tikhonov, two theorists who
would play a major role in the development of perestroika. Zaslavskaya contended that
farmers were becoming alienated from their work because the relations of production had
not really been altered since Stalin’s time, and Tikhonov argued that the state’s over
administration of the agricultural sector had stifled the creative instinct of Soviet peasants.
Not surprisingly, both Zaslavskaya and Tikhonov recommended that farmers be given
more freedom to decide what to produce and what methods to use to achieve the desired
results as a means of improving the Soviet agricultural system.10
Apparently the analyses provided by Zaslavskaya and Tikhonov impressed
Gorbachev because the 1982 CPSU “Food Program,” for which he had ultimate
responsibility, called for the for the expansion of the farm family contract arrangement.
Specifically, it allowed individual groups of farm families (zvenos) to merge with other
such groups on the collective farm to form to form a larger entity (brigada).n While the
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brigada, which could have up to thirty members, was similar to the zveno in that each unit
leased land and equipment from the farm management and was responsible for providing
the collective with an agreed upon quota, the two semi-autonomous units differed in terms
of organization and payment. Whereas the zveno operated according to precepts of
collective decision-making and responsibility, with all members being paid equally, the
brigadi had a selected leader who supervised the operation and paid members according to
the quality and quantity of work that each one contributed.12
By legalizing the brigadi, Gorbachev hoped to re-stimulate peasant initiative and to
enable individual groups of farm families to produce more efficiently by coordinating
planting and harvesting plans with other such groups on a collective farm. To
Gorbachev’s satisfaction, the brigadi did yield favorable results. In 1983, the brigadi
helped increase Soviet agri-cultural output by 5.1 percent.13 Further, the percentage of
total food production contributed by teams on collective contract (i.e., zvenos and brigadi)
grew in each of the years that Gorbachev continued to preside over agriculture.14 These
accomplishments of the zvenos and brigadi led Gorbachev to assert early in his leadership
as General Secretary that “the collective contract and economic accountability are the most
important factors for increasing the efficiency of (agricultural) production.”15
Gorbachev’s Call for Ideological Renewal
Having benefited from the advice given to him by Zaslavskaya and Tikhonov in
1982, Gorbachev appointed both of them to a special group created to restudy the NEP
when he was elected General Secretary of the CPSU in March of 1985. Headed by Abel
Aganbegyan, a leading Soviet economist, this study group devoted nearly one year to
identifying elements of the NEP which could be adapted to the present-day Soviet
Union.16 Receiving the group’s recommendations just prior to Twenty-Seventh CPSU
Congress in February of 1986, Gorbachev decided to propose to the Congress that a
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modified tax in kind be made a primary basis for continuing the improvement of
agricultural productivity.
In his opening speech to the Party Congress, Gorbachev said:
The main idea is to give broad scope to economic methods of
management, to substantially broaden the autonomy of collective
and state farms, to increase their interest in and responsibility for
the end results. In substance, it is a question of creatively
applying, in the conditions of today, Lenin’s idea of the
food tax.17
Elaborating on this idea, Gorbachev stated that farms would be allowed to use all produce
harvested above the planned target as it saw fit. Although he hoped that the state would be
able to procure this additional produce through heightened pay for it and other incentives,
he explicitly stated that farms could sell it on the collective farm market or through
cooperative trade outlets.18
Had Gorbachev alluded to Lenin’s NEP only this one time in the speech to the
Twenty-Seventh Party Congress, it probably would have been enough to cause quite a stir
among Soviet social scientists and Western observers alike. However, Gorbachev aroused
everyone’s curiosity about the direction in which he hoped to lead the USSR by making
reference to two other significant components of Lenin’s gradualist plan: creative
development of ideology and state support for voluntary cooperatives. In a section of his
speech dedicated to evaluating the relationship between ideology and reality, Gorbachev
asserted that “fidelity to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine lies in creatively developing it on the
basis of the experience that has been accumulated.”19 Further, Gorbachev posited that it
was imperative for socialist ideology “to draw its energy and effectiveness from the
interaction of advanced ideas with the practice of building a new society.”20
In the same speech to the Party Congress, Gorbachev stated that creating actual
conditions in which the worker regained a sense of ownership for his labor was critical to
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the task of renewing Soviet ideology.21 According to Gorbachev, one way of providing
the worker with such a feeling of ownership was to encourage self-reliant and selfgoverning cooperatives. For this reason, Gorbachev proclaimed:
And wherever the need exists, utmost support should be given to
the establishment and growth of cooperative enterprises and
organizations. They should become widespread in the
manufacture and processing of products, in housing construction
and in construction on garden and vegetable allotments, and in
the spheres of services and trade.22
Gorbachev’s call for an updated tax in kind, a re-evaluation of official ideology,
and the promotion of independent cooperatives inspired numerous Soviet analysts to re
examine Lenin’s later works and the NEP experience. One such person was Fyodor
Burlatsky, a renowned Soviet journalist. In an article for Literaturnaya Gazeta, Burlatsky
proposed some modifications of ideas espoused by Lenin to contribute to the gradual
development of socialism. First, like Gorbachev, he called for an updated tax in kind,
which would be predicated on the provision of greater economic independence to collective
farms and state farms and the creation of a more equivalent system of exchange between
the farms and the state. Second, he advocated that cooperatives be created in all economic
sectors which, from the outset, could practice internal self-government and economic self
accountability.23 Finally, Burlatsky recommended that the CPSU put Lenin’s theory of
self-critical evaluation of policy into practice by “resolutely rejecting methods that have not
worked, and developing a clear concept of constructive transformations.”24
Establishing a Leninist Program for Change
Conducting just such a sort of self-critical evaluation of its policies, the Gorbachev
government decided that it was necessary to present legislation on individual labor activity
to the Supreme Soviet. In lobbying for approval of the bill, the government identified three
primary benefits that individual labor activity would have for the Soviet economy.
According to the government, the new legislation could “bring the ‘desirable’ part of the
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shadow economy under state control and taxation.”25 Additionally, the new law would be
helpful in tapping “unused labor reserves,” because the people who would be eligible to
perform individual labor activity— housewives, students, and pensioners— accounted for
an estimated 20 percent of the population. Finally, the government claimed that the new
workers which the law would create could provide badly needed consumer goods and
services.26
On November 19, 1986, the USSR Supreme Soviet passed the Law on Individual
Labor Activity. Although the law did not become operative until May 1, 1987, there were
approximately 8,000 individual enterprises employing over 80,000 people registered with
the state by October of the same year.27 Perhaps more impressively, though, these
enterprises provided the public with an estimated 134 million rubles worth of goods and
services.28 In light of this success, Gorbachev determined that it would be economically
beneficial to expand the entrepreneurial opportunities for all Soviet workers. In contrast to
the Law on Individual Labor Activity, which only allowed family members residing
together to form new enterprises, Gorbachev envisaged a law which would permit
unrelated individuals to establish large-sized cooperatives.29 As a means of building
support for such a law, Gorbachev, in two major speeches, recounted Lenin’s
recommendations for the promotion of cooperatives by the state.
In his first speech, which was given to a special joint session of the CPSU Central
Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of
the Bolshevik revolution, Gorbachev praised Lenin for recognizing that cooperatives were
“(one) of the very ways and means of moving towards socialism.”30 Gorbachev further
asserted that Stalin’s policy of collectivization represented “a deviation from Leninist policy
with respect to the peasantry.”31 Finally, after stating that the government was seriously
taking into account the lessons of the NEP and collectivization in building perestroika,
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Gorbachev proclaimed that radical economic reform would require “a drastic expansion of
the independence of associations and enterprises.”32
Gorbachev revealed one way in which he hoped to contribute to such a “drastic
expansion” in a speech given to the Fourth All-Union Congress of Collective Farmers in
March 1988: through a new law on cooperatives. In his opening remarks to this congress,
Gorbachev paraphrased Lenin’s quotation that “the growth of cooperatives is the same as
the growth of socialism” and reiterated his belief that “blatant distortions of Leninist
teachings were perpetrated when collectivization was carried out in the late 1920s and early
1930s.”33 Then, after recounting how much cooperatives had helped the Soviet economy
during the NEP, Gorbachev proclaimed that “the cooperative movement and all its diversity
a

must be revived.”34
To spark this revival, Gorbachev told the congress that the Politburo had approved
a draft law on cooperatives and was submitting it for public discussion. This proposed
legislation included provisions allowing universal right to participation, expanded sphere of
operation, and increased auxiliary privileges for cooperatives. The draft law also contained
amendments requiring the state to contribute to the development of cooperatives by
providing credit to them, not hampering them with a lengthy licensing process, and not
burdening them with heavy taxes.35 The net result of this draft law and the state’s
commitment to it, Gorbachev hoped, would be to “bring Lenin’s ideas on cooperatives into
the present day.”36
Following this speech, numerous Soviet reformers placed themselves squarely
behind the cooperative movement. This list included the sociologist Tatyana Zaslavskaya,
the ideologist Georgi Smirnov, and the historian Yuri Afanasyev.37 But the person who
argued most cogently for the development of cooperatives was Nikolai Ryzhkov, who was
Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers at the time (1988). In a speech given to the
Deputies of the Supreme Soviet, Ryzhkov elaborated on the contributions which
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cooperatives could make to the advancement of perestroika and the immediate improvement
of the Soviet economy.
Ryzhkov began his speech by stating that cooperatives were inherently appealing to
the Soviet people because they provided their members with material incentives and the
general population with desirable consumer goods. He also argued that cooperatives “by
nature” were responsive to market fluctuations, and that this attribute made them essential
to the task of recreating a socialist market like that which existed during the NEP. He
further posited that cooperatives were catalysts for scientific and technological innovations.
Finally, he claimed that cooperatives were a significant source of socialist renewal, which
could help lift the malaise which had enveloped the Soviet population during the last years
of the stagnant Brezhnev leadership.38 For these reasons, Ryzhkov boldly declared:
The expansion of cooperative activity is not just the latest tribute
to fashion, not some temporary zigzag of politics, but a vital
requirement for our further progress along the path of projected
social and economic transformations.39
Although Ryzhkov’s speech was received well in general by the Supreme Soviet,
there was one aspect of it which generated great debate: the taxation of cooperatives. The
proposal called for a progressive income tax, ranging from 30 to 90 percent, to be applied
to all cooperative members earning over 500 rubles per month. Numerous deputies from
both chambers of the Supreme Soviet voiced dissatisfaction with this proposal, and their
protest was taken seriously enough to have included in the cooperative law only broad
guidelines for taxation.40
After this amendment of the draft law, which ultimately made local authorities the
sole beneficiary of cooperative taxation and which encouraged them to grant cooperatives
tax breaks, the Supreme Soviet voted unanimously in favor of the Law on Cooperatives,
and it went into effect on July 1,1988. This law established that cooperatives were one of
the fundamental elements of the Soviet socialist economy and that they were allowed to
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engage in any activity not proscribed by USSR or republican legislation. The law also
required local state officials to coordinate with cooperatives so that these enterprises could
draw up their own five-year operating and budgetary plans. Further, the law permitted
cooperatives to price their goods and services according to market supply and demand
except when the state purchased the product or when the cooperative output was made with
state-supplied natural resources or acquired through the central allocation system.41
Following the enactment of this law, many individuals decided to join or form
cooperatives. Prior to the passage of the Law on Cooperatives by the Supreme Soviet, only
about 14,000 cooperatives existed, and they produced a mere 350 million rubles worth of
goods and services, or .1 percent of the Soviet national product. However, by January 1,
1989, some 77,500 cooperatives employing approximately 1,392,000 people were
registered with the state, and they produced 6 billion rubles worth of output, or 1 percent
of the Soviet national product. In 1989, cooperative activity grew at an even greater rate.
As of July 1, 1989, 133,000 cooperatives employing 2,900,000 people existed in the
USSR, and they produced 12.9 billion rubles worth of goods and services, or 3 percent of
the Soviet national product. Considering that the 2,900,000 people working for
cooperatives by July 1989 represented only 1.5 percent of the Soviet labor force, their
output level was quite exceptional42
The marked success of the cooperatives did more than just help bolster the Soviet
economy. It created a highly prosperous group of people, and this group drew the ire of
many Soviet citizens. After decades of egalitarian wage leveling, people resented the fact
that cooperative workers could earn salaries which dwarfed those given by the state.
(According to statistics revealed for the fourth quarter of 1988, the average monthly wage
for cooperative workers was 406 rubles before distribution of profits while that of state
employees was only 217 rubles.43 People were especially infuriated about this wage
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differential because they felt that it was created in large part by the exorbitant prices charged
by cooperatives for their goods and services.44
The public made their dissatisfaction with perceived cooperative price gouging
known in several ways. First, in several polls taken in 1988, large numbers of people
expressed reservations about cooperatives. Second, many citizens wrote to local and
national Soviet newspapers and complained about the “unjustified incomes” of cooperative
employees. Finally, in various republics, violent “pogroms” began to be carried out
against cooperatives.45 Seizing upon this public hostility towards cooperatives,
conservative elements within the Soviet leadership lobbied for legislation restricting the
sphere of activities in which cooperatives could participate. While a resolution towards this
end was passed, a closer look at the processes involved and the results achieved will show
that the reformers actually dictated the pace and scope of cooperative restrictions.
To begin with, many of Gorbachev’s allies, including Ryzhkov, recognized that, in light of
public resentment towards cooperatives, some restrictions on non-state-owned businesses
needed to be enacted to signal to all that rampant capitalism would not come to dominate the
Soviet economy. Further, Gorbachev selected numerous experts in the fields of
economics, law, sociology, and medicine to speak about the necessity of adopting a
resolution which prevented cooperatives from engaging in activities which threatened
public safety. Specifically, these experts argued that some cooperatives were selling goods
and services which either were already illegal or which were harmful to Soviet citizens, and
these experts asserted that the state could publish a list of forbidden activities which would
not affect many cooperatives and which would benefit society greatly 46 Thus, as one of
their last acts of 1988, the Council of Ministers issued a decree which precluded
cooperatives from engaging in such dubious endeavors as production of moonshine,
narcotics, and weapons, and which applied to an estimated one percent of
existing cooperatives.47
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Recreating Diverse Forms of Socialist Property
In fact, the legislation restricting cooperative activities did not really deter aspiring
entrepreneurs. In the first quarter of 1989, 21,800 new cooperatives were formed, and the
entire cooperative sector contributed 4.3 billion rubles worth of goods and services to the
Soviet economy. An additional 43,700 cooperatives were created in the second quarter of
1989, and, together with already existing cooperatives, they helped produce 8.6 billion
rubles worth of output, which was twice as great as the first quarter figure for 1989 and
nearly 50 percent greater than the yearly statistic for 1988.48 These trends convinced
Gorbachev that it was politically possible and economically necessary to encourage
cooperatives to expand their scale of operations and to increase popular support for
economic pluralism.
Gorbachev began his quest for new legislation to promote continued development
of cooperatives at the March 1989 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. In his
opening speech to the Plenum, Gorbachev declared that a new agrarian policy was needed
to improve the Soviet food situation, and that the bases for this policy could be discerned
by studying the agricultural history of the USSR. He then recounted the successes of the
NEP and the failures of collectivization, and contended that the degree of voluntariness
upon which the two policies were predicated was the primary reason for the opposite
results they achieved. Whereas peasants were allowed to decide freely about joining a
cooperative under the NEP, their land was expropriated and they were forced to work on
state-controlled collective farms under Stalin’s leadership 49
According to Gorbachev, the effect of collectivization was the “alienation of rural
toilers from (their) property.”50 In order to “resolutely overcome this alienation,” he
advocated a “restructuring of economic relations in the countryside.”51 He argued that this
“restructuring” could be accomplished only if the state recognized “the equality of different
forms of socialist ownership of the means of production” and if peasants were offered
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“broad opportunities for showing independence, enterprise, and initiative”.52 In
Gorbachev’s opinion, leasing represented one of the best ways for promoting agricultural
restructuring, because it was through leasing that “Lenin’s idea of the active involvement of
personal interest can be realized most fully and people’s sense of proprietorship restored to
them.”53 Consequently, Gorbachev proposed that a law on leasing be created.54
During the summer of 1989, a resolution on leasing was drafted and, in the
autumn, it was submitted for public discussion. One of the people who most cogently
argued for the institutionalization of leasing was Vadim Medvedev, then-chairman of the
Central Committee Ideological Commission. Specifically, Medvedev contended that
leasing was a very desirable property type for Soviet society for two reasons. First,
leasing could provide significant worker incentives, and, second, it was still a socialized
form of ownership by virtue of the fact that the state functioned as “landlord.”55
After receiving the support of the CPSU Central Committee, the leasing resolution
was debated at the November session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Pavel Bunich, ViceChairman of the Supreme Soviet’s Joint Committee on Questions of the Economic Reform,
proposed the resolution. The draft law stated that lessees could be state organizations,
cooperatives, individual labor concerns, or groups of Soviet citizens. Concerning land, the
law stated that lessees could lease land for periods of five years to life. If the lessee died
during the term of the lease, the lease could be passed on to another member of the leasing
group, and upon expiration of the lease, the lessee group would have first claim on a
renewed lease on the property in question. The proposed leasing law also included
provisions allowing workers to lease equipment from an enterprise in return for a fee or a
contractually-agreed upon output level to be delivered to the lessor. Similarly, an
enterprise could lease itself from a superior ministry and could fulfill the lease contract by
meeting target figures set by the state or by paying a rent.56
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To gamer support for the resolution, Bunich asserted that the proposed law on
leasing would promote socialist renewal and economic revival. According to Bunich, the
resolution would contribute to the former goal by allowing Soviet citizens to reclaim
ownership of their land and their labor, and to the latter goal by increasing worker
productivity and state revenues.57 Despite Bunich’s arguments, criticism of the draft law
came from both dogmatic Communists and market-oriented reformers in the Supreme
Soviet. The former group was led by Mikhail Safin, who argued that better equipment and
more investment for state and collective farms was all that was needed to improve Soviet
agriculture, not a law promoting the breakup of socialist farms. In contrast, radical
reformers led by Anatoly Sobchak posited that the proposed law did not give citizens
sufficient ownership rights.58
Alexander Nikonov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet’s Joint Committee on
Agrarian Questions and Food did much to reduce the concerns of both groups. To relieve
the fears of old guard Communists, he cited statistics which showed that there were
numerous state and collective farms which were successful and which were not in jeopardy
of being broken up. To win the votes of the radical reformers, he recommended that the
leasing law be voted on with the stipulation that a law on property be developed to
complement the leasing law. The result of Nikonov’s maneuvering was the passage of the
leasing law by a vote of 268 to 71, with 30 abstentions 59
Following passage of the leasing law, Gorbachev immediately assigned Leonid
Abalkin, one of his closest economic advisors, to draft a bill on property. Before actually
designing legislation, however, Abalkin chose to justify ideologically the existence of
diverse property forms within the USSR. He undertook this task at a special conference on
economic reform held in late November 1989. In his keynote address to this All-Union
Theoretical and Practical Conference, Abalkin contended that objective analysis of “the
concept of socialism that V.I. Lenin arrived at in the last years of his life” revealed that “the
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diversity of forms of public ownership is not a transitional stage but the normal state of the
socialist economy.”60 Proceeding from this statement, he posited that it was necessary to
transform unprofitable state enterprises “into leaseholding, cooperative, joint-stock, private
(based on individual labor activity) and mixed enterprises.”61
After this conference, Abalkin began constructing a legal framework for the
existence of diverse property forms in the USSR. Under Abalkin’s draft legislation,
property could be owned by citizens, cooperatives, the state, and foreign investors.62 In
February 1990, the Central Committee voted to include Abalkin’s property proposals in the
platform it would present to the Twenty-Eighth Congress of the CPSU in July.63 Then,
following this vote of Party confidence, Abalkin campaigned for Supreme Soviet passage
of the draft law on property ownership. On March 6,1990, after relatively little debate, the
Supreme Soviet approved the 34—article resolution on property, and Mikhail Gorbachev
signed it into law.64 Finally, the Law on Property in the USSR went into effect on
July 1, 1990.
Evaluating Perestroika
The preceding examination of Mikhail Gorbachev’s reform efforts reveal several
facts. First, from the time that he was made Central Committee Secretary responsible for
agriculture in 1978, he recognized that decades of collectivization policy had stifled the
creative initiative of Soviet farmers, and, as he became more familiar with other sectors of
the economy, he realized that this problem plagued virtually all types of Soviet workers.
Second, in response to this problem, Gorbachev tried to increase worker incentives
through a variety of reforms, and the one in which he placed the greatest hope was the
reinstitutionalization of cooperatives. Third, to win support for his market-oriented
reforms, he referred to Lenin’s last writings and the experience of the NEP as a way of
demonstrating that diverse forms of ownership were meant to exist under socialism.
Conversely, to reshape further the opinions of Soviet citizens about non-state economic
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activity, Gorbachev portrayed Stalin’s forced collectivization as a gross deviation from
Leninist ideals. Clearly, Gorbachev’s reinterpretation of Lenin’s writings on the NEP and
his repudiation of Stalinism indicated that he was an advocate of the CPSU’s gradualist
tradition. Moreover, Gorbachev attempted to advance the gradualist cause by emphasizing
leasing as a preferred form of socialist property.
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C O N C LU SIO N S

Throughout its history, the Bolshevik Party has claimed to base its program of
action on the teachings of Karl Marx and V.I. Lenin. Since the Bolshevik Party, later
renamed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), has governed the USSR for
more than seventy years, two facts about the Soviet political system can be discerned from
the above assertion. First, Soviet leaders, to varying degrees, have used ideology as a
policy-making criterion, and second, the writings of Marx and Lenin have been used to
establish a standard against which to evaluate the ideological legitimacy of specific Soviet
policies. By examining the views of Marx and Lenin on cooperatives and analyzing the
economic programs of Bukharin, Stalin, and Gorbachev relating to these worker
collectives, much can be learned about the ways in which Soviet leaders have used
ideology to formulate and implement policy.
First, the conditions under which Marx and Lenin thought cooperatives could
contribute to the construction of socialism can be identified. Second, the motivations of
Bukharin, Stalin, and Gorbachev for introducing cooperative reform programs can be
discovered. Third, the functions which these three Soviet leaders hoped ideology would
serve in the promotion of these programs can be ascertained. Fourth, the degree of fidelity
to Marxism-Leninism embodied in the different cooperative policies espoused by
Bukharin, Stalin, and Gorbachev can be measured. Finally, some ways of legitimately
developing Marxism-Leninism can be distinguished.
Marx expressed great optimism in the socialist potential of cooperatives because
they involved all cooperative members in the production process and provided for a more
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equitable distribution of assets than did capitalist firms. However, for cooperatives to
contribute meaningfully to the construction of socialist society, Marx argued that political
power had to be in the hands of the proletariat and that cooperatives had to be expanded on
a nationwide scale. But, at no time, Marx proclaimed, should coercion be used by a
socialist government to compel individuals to join cooperatives. In Marx’s opinion, it was
the voluntary nature and economic independence that cooperatives possessed which made
them such a socially desirable labor form.
In his writings, Lenin frequently praised Marx for his recognition of the usefulness
of cooperatives in building socialism and asserted that, upon their seizure of power in
Russia, the Bolsheviks would work to establish a network of producers’ and consumers’
cooperatives. Even during the trying times of the Russian Civil War, Lenin reaffirmed his
intention of making voluntary cooperatives one of the foundations of Soviet socialist
society. After the Bolsheviks’ triumph in the Civil War, Lenin attempted to honor this
commitment by introducing the New Economic Policy (NEP) as a means of creating a
market socialist economy. As the NEP helped alleviate the devastation left by the Civil War
and cooperatives proved themselves to be economically productive, Lenin recommended
that a market socialist economy be maintained indefinitely and that cooperatives be
promoted as a way of helping peasants develop into socialism.
Largely due to the positive assessments on cooperatives provided by Marx and
Lenin, three subsequent Soviet leaders chose to make worker collectives a vital component
of their economic programs. However, the ways in which each leader intended
cooperatives to contribute to the improvement of the Soviet society varied significantly.
Nikolai Bukharin, the Bolshevik who most influenced Soviet policy immediately following
the death of Lenin, advocated the continuation of state support for voluntary and
independent cooperatives because he wanted to promote the gradual development into
socialism that Lenin had recommended. Josef Stalin, who had Bukharin removed from
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power, rejected this strategy and instead attempted to build socialism rapidly by making all
economic entities, including cooperatives, subservient to the state. Finally, more than
thirty years after the death of Stalin, Mikhail Gorbachev initiated a campaign to give more
incentives and autonomy to cooperatives in an effort to reconstruct Soviet socialism into a
form resembling that envisioned by Lenin and Bukharin.
Although Bukharin, Stalin, and Gorbachev had markedly different goals for
cooperatives to fulfill, each of the three leaders claimed that he was basing his program on
Marxism-Leninism. While Bukharin and Gorbachev asserted that they were attempting to
execute the gradualist legacy left by Lenin in his last writings, Stalin referred to some of
Lenin’s earlier pieces on the NEP, in which the first Soviet leader depicted the NEP as a
temporary retreat from socialism, as a means of defending his attempt to build socialism
rapidly. Stalin further justified his decision to implement mass collectivization by arguing
that Marx’s theory of class warfare necessitated that the Soviet government liquidate the
kulaks, a semi-capitalist element that had allegedly come to dominate the countryside, in
order to be able to construct socialism.
In addition to serving as a source of motivation for the three leaders, MarxismLeninism was used in other ways by Bukharin, Stalin, and Gorbachev. First, all three
leaders won approval for their cooperative policies within the CPSU by presenting them as
vehicles for realizing the goals of Marx and Lenin. Second, the three leaders explained
their cooperative programs to the public in ideological terms to demonstrate their dedication
to the task of building socialism, a tactic which they hoped would lend political legitimacy
to the Soviet government. Finally, Bukharin, Stalin, and Gorbachev relied on ideological
campaigns to inspire Soviet citizens to participate in and support cooperatives.
However, while Bukharin, Stalin, and Gorbachev all portrayed themselves as
legitimate executors of the wills of Marx and Lenin, close examination reveals that this was
not the case. Regarding cooperatives, it is evident that only Bukharin and Gorbachev
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faithfully adhered to Marxist-Leninist ideals. They promoted the development of voluntary
and independent cooperatives and advocated that there be a system of equivalent exchange
between the state and the cooperatives, and they recognized that these objectives required a
long-term commitment to a market socialist economy. On the other hand, it is abundantly
clear that Stalin deviated from the Marxist-Leninist course. By choosing to collectivize the
peasantry, Stalin violated the principle against forcibly expropriating peasants established
by Marx and Lenin. Further, in creating equal wages for all cooperative workers, Stalin
abandoned the Marxist-Leninist precept that citizens of a socialist society should be able to
earn according to their work.
In counterpoint to Stalin’s perversion of Marxism-Leninism, Bukharin and
Gorbachev provide examples of how Soviet ideology can be expanded legitimately.
Bukharin contributed to the development of Marxism-Leninism through theoretical
discourse. Specifically, Bukharin’s idea that cooperatives could help peasants grow into
socialism through the contacts that these enterprises made with other socialist institutions
increased CPSU support for independent worker collectives and encouraged the state bank
to provide the financial assistance necessary for the cooperatives to flourish. Gorbachev
added to Soviet ideology by adapting Marxism-Leninism to the current conditions of the
USSR. In particular, Gorbachev argued that for cooperatives to help Soviet socialism
continue to evolve positively, the state needed to institutionalize a regulated market and a
plurality of forms of ownership, with leasing being given a preferential status.
In summation, then, the preceding analysis of the beliefs of Marx and Lenin
concerning cooperatives and programs relating to worker collectives devised and
implemented by Bukharin, Stalin, and Gorbachev reveal several important facts about
Marxism-Leninism and its role in the Soviet political system. First, Marx and Lenin
believed that voluntary and autonomous cooperatives were vital to the construction of
socialism. Second, the forced collectivization campaign executed by Stalin thus actually
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represented a gross deviation from Marxism-Leninism, while the cooperative policies
espoused by Bukharin and Gorbachev in fact were efforts to realize the vision of Marx and
Lenin. Third, the attempts by Bukharin and Gorbachev to revitalize the Soviet economy
through the promotion of cooperatives suggest that ideology can be a source of inspiration
for Soviet leaders. Fourth, the theories and policies conceived of by Bukharin and
Gorbachev to help bolster cooperatives show that Marxism-Leninsm can be creatively
developed. Finally, the fact that Bukharin and Gorbachev chose to justify their cooperative
programs to both the CPSU and the people indicate that Soviet leaders feel that ideology is
an important legitimating tool.
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